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IN THE S,UPREME COURT 
of the 
STAllE OF UTAH 
JOHN SHAW, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
FRANCES SHAW PILCHER and 
WALTER F. PILCHER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8991 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The only question presented on appeal is the mean-
ing of an "independent action'' within the purview of 
Rule 60-B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. The action was not tried 
upon its merits and no evidence was taken. Since the only 
question involved is one of law re}ating to the procedural 
propriety of the action commenced in the court below, 
we will simply set forth a sufficient background of the 
facts to frame the issue to be decided on appeal. 
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Through a previous marriage, appellant John Shaw 
and respondent Frances Shaw Pilcher had born to them 
a daughter, Candace Lee Shiaw, now twelve years of age. 
Upon their divorce, custody of the child was awarded 
to Frances Shaw, who subsequently married respondent 
Walter Pilcher. After the latter marriage, respondent 
Walter Pilcher desired to adopt Candace Lee Shaw, and 
appellant gave his consent to such adoption after having 
been assured by respondents that they were financially 
able and morally fit to provide a proper home for the 
child, and that such adoption would be in the best interests 
of the child. The adoption was granted on November 17, 
1956 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah (Decree). 
On August 5, 1957 respondents plead guilty to the 
crime of embezzlement in the United States District 
Court for Utah and were sentenced to a prison term at 
Terminal Isl,and Federal Penitentiary (Answer). On 
February 29, 1958 respondents were released on proba-
tion and parol and returned to Salt Lake City (Answer). 
Appellant discovered that respondents had plead guilty 
to a series of embezzle1nents and that respondents had 
probably been committing the eriine of embezzlement 
from day to day over a protracted period of tin1e, includ-
ing the time when the adoption proceedings were taking 
place in 1956. AppeUant, concluding that the adoption 
had been procured b)T fraudulent representations made 
by respondents to the court, thereupon decided to attempt 
to vacate the adoption and to secure to himself the 
custody of Candace Lee Shaw so that he could insure to 
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her proper care, comfort, instruction and security in his 
home. 
Accordingly, on March 31, 1958 appellant filed a Mo-
tion and Order which opened for inspection and copying 
the 1adoption file of Candace Lee Shaw, Probate No. 
39215. On April 21, 1958 appellant, using the same Pro-
bate ·Case Number, filed 'a Petition to vacate the adoption 
and an Order requiring respondents to appear and show 
cause why the adoption should not be vacated. The action 
thus commenced was based upon two grounds ; namely 
(1) the adoption was not procured by following the 
proper statutory procedures and was therefore void, and 
(2) the adoption was procured by fraud upon the court 
and should therefore be vacated (Petition). The Petition 
was accompanied by a Summons. A copy of the Sum-
mons, Petition, and Order to Show Cause were person-
ally served upon respondents. Respondents engaged an 
attorney to answer the Petition, and, consequently, the 
Order to Show Cause was dismissed by appellant's 
attorney so that the action could he prepared for trial 
and determined upon its merits. 
At the pre-trial conference, respondents filed an 
Amended Answer alleging that the question of fraud 
upon the court could only be tried by 1an independent 
action since the •action pending had not been brought 
within three months after the adoption had been granted. 
The Amended Answer relied on Rule 60-B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In order to determine the meaning of Rule 60-B in 
advance of a trial upon the merits, a special hearing was 
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held to determine whether the action thus commenced by 
' appelLant was proper for determining whether the adop-
tion . had been obtained through fraud upon the court. 
The lower court held that since more than three months 
had elapsed between the adoption and the petition to va-
cate the adoption, the question of fraud upon the court 
could only be tried by an independent action. The lower 
court then concluded that Rule 60-B must be strictly con-
strued, and that the action commenced by appellant was 
not an independent action within the meaning of the Rule. 
When appellant attempted to institute a new inde-
pendent action it was discovered that respondents had 
left U tab. and were residing in California. Since it was 
thus impossible for appellant to obtain new service of 
process over respondents, the present appeal was taken 
challenging the lower court's construction of Rule 60-B. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
ACTION COMMENCED BY APPELLANT WAS NOT AN 
INDEPENDENT ACTION WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
RULE 60-B OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 60-B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure per-
mits the court, in certain situations, to relieve a party, 
upon motion, from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing. But Rule 60-B concludes: 
"This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
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set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court~ 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action.'' 
If a motion under Rule 60-B asserts that a prior 
judgment was void, then such mo.tion must be made with-
in a "reason1able" time; whereas, if the motion asserts 
that an adverse party committed fraud, misrepresenta-
tion or misconduct, then such motion must be made 
within three months from entry of the judgment, order or 
proceeding. Of course, these limitations do not prevent 
an independent action from challenging a judgment on 
the ground of fraud upon the court. The action com-
menced by appellant asserted (1) that the adoption was 
void because the necessary statutory steps were not 
followed, and (2) that the adoption should be vacated 
since it was obtained by fraud upon the court. The first 
issue was properly triable by motion since it merely 
need be brought within a reasonable time, but the second 
issue was properly triable by an independent action. The 
question before this court on appeal is whether the action 
commenced by appellant was proper for the purpose of 
determining the question of fraud upon the court as well 
as the question of failure to follow statutory steps. 
It seems that the Utah Supreme Court has not yet 
construed Rule 60-B for the purpose of distinguishing 
between a motion ;and an independent action. The only 
authority which has been found on the precise point under 
discussion involves the construction of Rule 60-B of the 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are one or two 
minor differences between the Federal Rule and the Utah 
Rule, but, for purposes of the present analysis, the differ-
ences do not have any significance. Therefore, the con-
struction applied to the Federal Rule is helpful in con-
struing the corresponding Utah Rule. 
Professor James W. Moore states that there are 
no significant procedural differences between a motion 
and an independent action under Rule 60-B. Professor 
Moore explains that the independent action is expressly 
excluded from the time limitations applying to several 
of the motions under Rule 60-B because the rule did not 
intend to limit or preclude a separate action for fraud 
upon the court. Thus, stresses Professor Moore, if an 
action is one properly triable by an independent action, 
but is brought by motion, the motion should be con-
sidered as an independent action, and vi·ce versa. The 
following quotations from Moore, Federal Practi'Ce, Vol. 
7, are helpful : 
At page 642: 
"Where the adverse party is not prejudiced 
an independent action for relief from a federal 
judgment may be treated as a 60(b) motion; and, 
conversely, a 60 (b) 1notion 1nay be treated as the 
institution of an independent action." 
At page 623: 
"This independent ·action to enjoin or other-
wise obtain relief from a federal judgment need 
not be brought in the district court which render-
ed the judg1nent; but it n1ay be and, when it is, 
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there is not much procedural difference between 
it and a motion for relief under 60 (h) and hence, 
disregarding nomenclature, the court, unless a 
party would be adversely affected, may trea~ a 
motion as the institution of an independent actwn 
and an independent action as a motion for relief." 
At page 502: 
"And since nomenclature is unimportant a 
proceeding for relief under 60 (h) may in an ap-
propriate case be treated as an independent ac-
tion; and simi}arly an independent action may he 
treated as a proceeding under 60(b)." 
This same conclusion is set forth in Barron and 
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Edi-
tion§ 1330, page 269. 
The cases have also reached the siame conclusion as 
that suggested by Professor Moore. Perhaps the leading 
case on the very point at issue is Hadden v. Rumsey 
Products, Inc., 196 F. 2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1952). In the 
Hadden case the plaintiff reduced to judgment in the 
United States District Court in Ohio certain cognovit 
notes which had been executed by the defendant New 
York debtors. Plaintiff then forwarded to the Clerk of 
the United States District Court in New York a copy of 
the Ohio judgment for registration. Upon learning of 
such registration, the defendant New York judgment 
debtors filed a petition for a show cause order in the 
United States District Court in New York asserting that 
they had valid defenses to the notes upon which the Ohio 
judgment had been based. One of the questions on appeal 
was whether the petition for a show cause order was an 
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independent action within the meaning of Rule 60-B. In 
concluding that the petition should be considered as an 
independent action, the distinguished Second Circuit ably 
stated the spirit and purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure : 
"Rule 60 (b) expressly provides that the rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judg-
ment. The appellees' several petitions to the 
New York court may be treated as an independent 
action to obtain equitable relief from the Ohio 
judgment. Although Rule 3 states that an action 
is commenced by filing a complaint it would be 
quite out of harmony with the spirit of Rule 1 
to hold the appellees bound by the labels placed 
on the papers submitted to. the district court. Nor 
is it necessary that a summons should have been 
issued and served as contemplated by Rule 4, pro-
vided the appellant took action equivalent to 
entering his general appearance." 
A similar result was reached in Haggar Co. v. UniJted 
States (U.S. Ct. Claims, 128 F. Supp. 404, February 8, 
1955). In the Haggar case plaintiff brought an action 
against the government in the Court of Claims arising 
out of a contract whereby plaintiff had manufactured 
for the government certain ite1ns of clothing. Plaintiff 
sought to recover the contract price, but the governn1ent 
defended on the ground tl1at plaintiff had defectively 
manufactured the clothing and that it was "~orthless to 
the government, and ,,·as ~wrapped. The Court of Claims 
ruled against plaintiff. T"·o or three years later, plain-
tiff discovered that the government had used the clothing 
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in question and that the prior judgment had been ob-
tained by fraud upon the court in that the government 
had submitted false affidavits. Accordingly, plaintiff 
filed a new petition in the same case in the Court of 
Claims alleging fraud upon the court in the prior judg-
ment. One of the issues considered by the Court of 
Claims was whether plaintiff's petition should be treated 
·as an independent action within the meaning of Rule 
60-B (Rule 54-B in the U.S. Court of Claims Rules). The 
court concluded that it should be s'o considered, saying: 
"If the plaintiff practices a fraud in the 
prosecution of proof of his case in our court, he 
forfeits his claim no matter how meritorious his 
claim might otherwise have been, or how super-
erogatory may have been his attempted fraud. We 
eannot . tolerate being misled into unjust judg-
ments by answers to our calls which give us false 
impressions as to material facts. We assume that 
the writer of the communication in question had 
no intention to mislead his associates, and we are 
sure that his superiors, in responding to our eall, 
had no intention to mislead the court. But, if the 
plaintiff's present contentions are valid, the com-
munication was, in its effect, a false representa-
tion to the plaintiff and to the court. 
"We think that the most economical proced-
ure, in the circumstances, is for us to treat the 
plaintiff's present suit as an independent action 
to be relieved of the former adverse judgment. 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
courts have been liberal in treating pleadings as 
what they should have been, rather than what they 
were called by the pleader." 
It seems clear that there is even more justification 
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for considering the ease at bar as an independent action. 
The action was instituted by filing a petition and serving 
respondents personally with the petition and summons. 
'The name of the· case was different, although the same 
case number as the adoption was used. Respondents en-
gaged an attorney 'and were represented by counsel 
throughout the entire proceeding, and respondents thus 
filed an answer to appellant's petition and proceeded to 
prepare the case for trial. Depositions were taken. A 
Notice of Readiness for Trial was filed, and a pre-trial 
conference was held. It was at the pre-trial conference 
that respondents first urged any procedural defects in 
the action commenced by appellant. Under such pro-
cedure, which was identical to an independent action in 
every material respect, it is difficult to see how the lower 
court could conclude that Under Rule 60-B the action 
was nothing more than a motion. Such a holding is con-
trary to reason, and is in direct conflict with the unani-
mous declarations of the courts and treatise writers. 
Furthermore, the decision of the lower court is dir-
ectly contrary to the spirit and purpose of the rules of 
civil procedure in that such decision would require two 
separate trials for appellant to attempt to set aside the 
adoption. This is so because appellant's contention that 
the adoption was void because the necessary statutory 
steps were not followed can only be tried by motion, 
whereas appellant's contention that fraud was connnitted 
upon the court ean only be tried by an independent action. 
For the lo·wer court to conclude that the 1notion and in-
dependent action 1nust be strictly construed to be mu-
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tually exclusive under Rule 60-B is to complicate and 
hamstring judicial procedure in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
lower court was erroneous, and that the Order dismiss-
ing appellant's action should be reversed to allow a trial 
upon the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
by RICHARD L. DEWSNUP 
AttO'rneys for Appellant 
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